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THE  INTENSIFYING  COVERT WAR
BETWEEN  IRAN AND  THE  WEST
The magnetic bomb – attached to his car – that killed
Professor Mustafa Ahmadi Roshan in Tehran on
January 11, 2012 is the latest in a series of
assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists involved
in Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accused the Israeli secret
service, Mossad, of being behind this murder. As was
predicted, the Netanyahu administration totally
rejected this accusation.An alternative explanation to
Israel’s involvement is based on the growing tension
between Ahmadinejad and Ali Khamenei, the Iranian
Supreme Leader. There may also be a connection to
the upcoming U.S. presidential elections. The Israeli
frenzy in calling for a preemptive strike against Iran’s
facilities could actually portend a significant turning
point in the intricate story of the Iranian nuclear
dossier.
Coincidence or not, Professor Ahmadi Roshan was
the deputy head of the government’s commercial
uranium enrichment site at Natanz. The Iranian Fars
news agency reported that he had been involved in a
project for the production of polymeric membranes
for gaseous diffusions, a technology used to produce
enriched uranium.
The Iranian authorities immediately blamed Israel
and the United States for this premeditated murder,
accusing them of wanting to delay by any means,
legally or illegally, the Iranian nuclear program which
Tehran assures the international community is solely
for civilian purposes. The U.S. has unequivocally
denied any involvement in the affair, strongly
condemning, in the words of White House
spokesman Tommy Vietor, “all acts of violence,
including acts of violence like what is being reported
today [the assassination]”, including the killing of
Professor Roshan. The Israeli authorities, through
President Shimon Peres and the official spokesman
for the Israel Defense Force (IDF) Yoav Mordecha,
also denied any involvement in the Roshan affair.
Then, on February 13, coordinated car bomb attacks
targeted the Israeli embassies in New Delhi and
Tbilisi, Georgia. While in Tbilisi, an Israeli Embassy
staff member found an explosive device attached to
his car and called the Georgian Police to defuse the
bomb before it went off; in New Delhi a bomb
exploded and injured an Israeli diplomat's wife, as
well as several bystanders.
Minutes after these two events, Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu accused “Iran and its proxy
Hezbollah” of being behind both the explosion in
New Delhi and the attempted bombing in Tbilisi. “In
recent months we have witnessed several attempts to
attack Israeli citizens and Jews in several countries,
including Azerbaijan, Thailand, and others,”
Netanyahu said at a meeting with members from his
Likud party. Tehran, however, was swift to deny its
involvement in organizing the attacks. A statement
from the Iranian government, released by the BBC,
called the accusations “sheer lies” and regarded them
as part of an Israeli propaganda campaign. As
reported by Iran’s state news agency, IRNA, Iranian
Foreign Minister Ramin Mehmanparast mused that
Israel had itself planned its embassy car explosion in
New Delhi and an attempted car bomb in Tbilisi to
“tarnish Iran’s friendly relations with India and
Georgia,” adding that Netanyahu’s accusation against
Tehran is part of Israel’s “psychological warfare
against Iran.” Both incidents coincided with the
fourth anniversary marking the assassination of
Hezbollah’s deputy leader, Imad Mughniyah, which
the Islamist group attributes to Israel. Khamenei
pledged in January that Iran would seek revenge
against international sanctions and the assassination
of Iranian scientists involved in the nuclear program.
With the blame nearly impossible to assign, some
cryptic past statements, linked in one way or another
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to the Iranian nuclear issue, may provide some
insight and interpretations of what is going on, or at
least some clues as to the actions of covert forces
operating within the larger strategic game being
played out in the Israeli-Iranian conflict.
The IDF’s Yoav Mordechai, having declared that he
does not know who was behind the attack on the
Iranian professor, added that he did not shed tears
over the violent death of Roshan. The timely
disappearance of a key element in the continued
development of the Iranian nuclear program is seen in
Israel as a major setback for Ahmadinejad and the
Iranian regime, whose blatant anti-Semitic
statements are still causing turmoil and threaten to
unleash war in the Middle East.
The latest International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) report released on November 8, 2011 on the
Iranian issue has highlighted that the country has
made significant progress towards its declared goal
of developing civilian nuclear power. However, the
report cast heavy shadows on, and expressed
suspicions about, the purported civilian uses of the
program. In particular, allegations are being made
about purported research and studies directly
applicable to the development of detonators for
nuclear weapons, such as warheads and other
components, and the production of long-range
missiles. Israel and the United States have been the
most active nations in opposing the possibility of a
nuclear armed Iran, as Iran is located in one of the
most unstable areas on earth. These two allied
countries have for years - but more intensively in
recent months - been preparing contingency plans for
a possible preemptive air attack on Iran’s nuclear
facilities. As a decision is still awaiting on whether
Tel-Aviv and Washington will attack the Islamic
state, there are some intriguing interrelated facts
concerning the killing of Iranian scientists. Roshan is
not the first targeted-killing in Iran, but only one in a
long list of professors and scientists falling victim to
regional powers’geopolitical interests.
On July 23, 2011, Professor Daryoush Rezaei, 32,
another nuclear physicist involved in the
development of Iran’s nuclear program, was shot by
two assassins who then fled on a motorcycle. But
even more striking was an assassination attempt on
November 29, 2010 on current Vice President and
Head of Atomic Energy Organization Ferydoun
Abbassi Davani, and then manager of the project on
nuclear reactors Majid Shariari. The first was
seriously injured, while the second died on the spot
following the explosion of two bombs of the same
magnetic type used in the Roshan assassination, at
least according to a statement by Deputy Governor of
Tehran province Ali Safar Baratloo. Finally, on
January 12, 2010 Masoud Ali Mohammadi, an
Iranian nuclear scientist who was well known
internationally, died in the explosion of a motorcycle
which had been packed with explosives and primed
to detonate when his vehicle came close.
Investigations of these suspicious killings have not
yet produced results. Nonetheless, a propaganda war
between Iranian and Israeli authorities has ensured,
which affects both countries’ relations with the
United States. Tehran’s contention that Roshan and
the other scientists killed in the last two years were
victims of the Israeli secret service cannot be
confirmed.
Assuredly, the similarity of the materials used to kill
Roshan this year and Davani and Shariari on
November 29, 2010 would suggest that a single
organization was behind the attacks on Iranian
scientists. Since the highest priority goal of Israel
(and other Western countries) is to prevent Tehran
gaining atomic weapons, it is easy enough to make
the government of Benjamin Netanyahu the main
suspect. In addition, some secret operations
conducted by Mossad in recent years, and the
ruthlessness with which they were executed, may
suggest the direct involvement of Israeli intelligence
services. Attention should be paid to the case of
Mahmoud al-Mabhouh. A senior Hamas military
commander and one of the founders of the Izz ad-Din
al-Qassam Brigades, the military affiliate of Hamas,
al-Mabhouh was involved in arms trafficking before
his murder in a Dubai hotel on January 20, 2010.
According to the Police in the Emirate of Dubai,
closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras and the
images captured by hotel security lead many to
believe that the murder was carried out by Israeli
intelligence.
Though the involvement of Mossad in the affair
cannot be irrefutably proven, it cannot be disproven
either, since the stated goal of the Israeli secret
service is quite plain: to prevent Iran from producing
an atomic bomb. But there is another possible
interpretation of the Roshan assassination. Denying
any involvement of their own, the Israeli authorities
have implicitly hinted that the Iranian authorities
themselves might have ordered the killing of the
professor. This insinuation makes little sense if we
assume that Iran seeks to accelerate its nuclear
program. However, looked at from an internal
political perspective, it becomes a far more plausible
claim to some observers. Indeed, the clash between
Possible interpretations
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President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei has in recent months seen moments of high
tension, and the timing of the murders might
consequently be connected to Iranian internal
politics.
Khamenei’s decision to reinstate the former head of
the Ministry of Intelligence, Eider Moslehi, whom
Ahmadinejad had forced to resign in April 2011, and
the confrontation over Ahmadinejad’s current Chief
of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who occupied the
position of First Vice President of Iran for one week in
2009 before Khamenei ordered his removal from that
post, lay bare the bitter rivalry between the two most
important officers of the Iranian state. Roshan’s
murder may have been part of this collision at the
highest level. It could serve as a means to further
elevate the tension and the stakes and, by the same
token, to create a permanent state of siege and reduce
the influence of the nationalist front, represented by
Ahmadinejad and Mashaei in the face of growing
external threats. Although it is doubtful that Iran ever
wished to deprive itself of five of its own brightest
nuclear scientists over the span of two years, the
November IAEA report led to a new wave of more
stringent sanctions which seem to be about to affect
Tehran much more than previous ones.
It appears that the Obama administration’s decision to
strike the Iranian banking sector, identifying the
Central Bank of Iran (BCI) as a possible centre of
money laundering and terrorism financing, is causing
serious budget problems for Iran, as it discourages
international banks and financial intermediaries from
dealing with the BCI and undertaking new business
with Tehran.
From this perspective, Washington policy’s line
seems clear: no pre-emptive strike against Iran and its
nuclear sites, but heavy sanctions against, and
continued diplomatic pressure on, the Iranian regime.
This policy is partly determined by the declared
intention of Obama to partially withdraw U.S. troops
from the Middle East in the short to medium term.
The financial crisis and the debate on the U.S. public
debt ceiling have actually forced President Obama to
progressively disengage the U.S. from the region, as
evidenced by the departure of the last U.S. battalion
from Iraq in December and the objective to end the
engagement in Afghanistan by 2014. Moreover, the
upcoming presidential election is likely to dissuade
the White House from risking the possible
complications arising from another protracted war far
away from home.
However, an international crisis forced by an Israeli
attack on Iran could derail American plans and force
Washington to offer help and assistance to its ally. The
election year, and the increased attention to domestic
issues it imposes on the Obama administration, could
offer Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu a window of
opportunity. The White House has certainly not
forgotten what happened on the eve of Barack
Obama’s inauguration in January 2009.
On December 27, 2008, the Israeli government
launched “Operation Cast Lead” against Hamas in the
Gaza Strip. Moreover, while it is true that the U.S.
disengagement from the Middle East will proceed at a
slow pace, one must also consider that the U.S. has
now more leeway in its military policy. If the
simultaneous presence of two open fronts once
prevented the opening of a third one, the reduction in
America’s Middle East military commitments could
now offer opportunities to settle old scores with Iran
and its erstwhile supporters in the region.
If President Obama’s election snags were to persist, a
war against Iran, which could potentially restore his
shattered image among American voters, might be a
viable option. The French-led intervention in Libya
may be seen as an example of such a gamble, even if
there are serious doubts about the success of a
military operation in Iran or Washington’s
willingness to engage its troops in the Middle East
again, especially in conditions of severe economic
crisis, high oil prices, and world market volatility.
These considerations, however, are not in Israel’s
game plan. If the Jewish state sees its security
threatened by an open enemy possessing nuclear
weapons, it will counter the threat by any means
necessary.
In 2012 Ahmadinejad began his final year as
President of Iran. He faces increasing hostility from
Supreme Leader Khamenei and several members of
the parliament, which threatened to initiate
impeachment proceedings against him in May 2011
after he fired three ministers without the consent of
parliament. The time may have come for
Ahmadinejad to find a diplomatic solution to the
current impasse over the nuclear program issue, as the
increasingly stringent economic sanctions are
eroding his electoral base and further imperiling the
overall well-being and standard of living of ordinary
Iranians.
2012: the Breaking Point
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THE  ROLE  OF  FOREIGN  POLICY




In the absence of clear domestic political issues,
foreign policy, including national security issues, is
playing a greater than usual role in Russia’s
presidential election campaign.
The poor performance of the ruling United Russia
(UR) party in the Duma elections of December 4 has
been described by its supporters as evidence that the
election met “European standards.” However, the
reality is quite different. Elections held in mature
European parliamentary democracies usually focus
on key political, social and economic issues. In
contrast, the December Duma campaign was largely
devoid of debates on these specific issues and at times
revolved around nothing more than who could
outspend or rig the election better than their
opponents.
The United Russia party is the one to blame for failing
to formulate a consistent, contemporary and
European-type ideology, one based on domestic
issues. Its platform is simply that it is the party of
power and wants to say in that place. The party and
the executive branch of the Russian government are,
to all intents and purposes, one and the same thing,
which explains a great deal why United Russia almost
invariably takes credit for every “positive action” the
Kremlin undertakes, with public money. Opposition
parties – if we assume that such parties really exist –
were no better – none of the six which participated in
the elections managed to present any platform more
attractive than the one of the UR to the electorate. In
spite of its current standing, the UR has seen in recent
years a consistent decrease in the percentage of votes
it gets from the populace. Nevertheless, opposition
parties have chosen to remain bystanders and watch
from a privileged position the effective erosion of the
UR mandate among ordinary Russians.
Consequently, debates and exchanges on foreign
policy issues were quite limited during the December
legislative election. Two factors can explain this
omission. First, Russia is not currently at war; no
major military conflicts are taking place on its
borders. In the absence of a clear and overriding
threat to the national security, Russians prefer to fix
their attention on domestic issues, as political parties
elsewhere do in similar circumstances.
Second, Russia’s foreign policy is within the sole
domination of the executive branch, traditionally
conducted by the interaction between the Presidential
Administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
although in 2008 the office of the Prime Minister,
Vladimir Putin, was also added to the mix. The
foreign policy function of the Duma is almost purely
symbolic, usually limited to the approval of
international treaties.
However, international issues have return to the
forefront of public debate during the current
presidential campaign, and this issue has been raised
by the leading presidential candidate, Vladimir Putin.
He has emphasized them in setting his campaign
apart from the pack. This is a predictable strategy
given that he is the only candidate with previous
foreign affairs experience. Putin can easily portray
himself as being far more capable than any other in
this sphere of expertise.
Putin’s sudden interest in foreign affairs is, partly,
motivated by tactical considerations. Stability, the
main achievement brought about by Putin’s
leadership, seems to be hit by decreased demand.
Standing for election on the same track as President’s
Medvedev’s “modernization” program cannot alone
carry the day. Putin might be asked why he, and not
the one who proposed the modernization program,
Medvedev, is now seeking the presidency. Since
Putin’s advisors are unable to formulate a dominant
theme for the election campaign, especially on the
home front, he has no other alternative but to discuss
Russia’s stormy relations with the outside world.
This subject is not entirely devoid of immediate
relevancy. There is growing concern in Russia about
the deployment of anti-missile defense systems in
Eastern Europe and the need to modernize the
Russian military. Russia genuinely believes that these
systems, deployed next to its European border,
constitute an acute threat to its national security. The
Kremlin sees no reason to hide its security fears from
the wider public and the international community.
While the attention placed by Russian officials on
such concerns is legitimate and understandable, it is
44 304 - 305    Fevral - Mart    2012
the tone of their rhetoric that is worrying. In a speech
at a campaign rally on Manezh Square in Moscow on
December 12, Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s former
ambassador to NATO, warned that Russia could
become the “easy prey” of some (unnamed)
antagonistic “forces in Europe.” Naturally, it is easy
to dismiss such a statement as just another typical
piece of extremist anti-Western propaganda from the
mouth of the confrontational and hawkish ex-
ambassador if not for the fact that the very next day
after the meeting, Rogozin became one of the senior
organizers of Putin’s election campaign. It is clear
that such views, and the way they are expressed, are
likely to become government practice should Putin be
elected.
Putin himself stirred things up a bit by pointing his
finger at the United States, and specifically Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton, for the massive protests
which erupted in Russia after last December’s State
Duma elections. According to Putin, “[Clinton] set
the tone for some of the activists inside our country,
gave them a signal, they heard this signal and started
active work with support from US State Department”
(Daily Telegraph, December 8, 2012).
It is inconceivable to any person well-versed in
Russian politics that Putin does not realize the
absurdity of this accusation. Yet the idea of Russia
being stalked by an “enemy at the gate” resonates
with many voters in the ex-communist country, as a
new level of mistrust has developed towards the
United States, 20 years after the Cold War officially
ended. Interestingly, Putin’s statement was
enthusiastically backed by Gennady Zyuganov, the
leader of the Communist Party – Putin’s main “rival”
in the presidential race, who called the protest
meetings an “orange leprosy,” and claimed it had
been organized by “American secret services.”
Undoubtedly, the topic of foreign interference in
Russia’s internal affairs is going to play a prominent
role in election debates until March 4, the last day of
the election campaign.
Putin’s heightened anti-Western rhetoric may act as a
cold shower for those who a few months ago opined
that the “possible election of Putin as the president of
Russia will not signify a fundamental change in the
direction of U.S.-Russia relations” (Andrew
Kuchins, the Valdai Discussion Club, September 29,
2011). They might still be correct in the final analysis:
Soon-to-be President-elect, Putin may well correct
his tendency to fire-off malapropos statements while
in office after March and effectively return to the
characteristically pragmatic approach to foreign
policy of his first presidential term. Words, however,
are important in politics, even if they are uttered in the
heat of election campaigns. They may be taken at face
value.
With U.S. President Barack Obama announcing on
January 5 that the Pentagon can expect serious cuts in
the near future, hawkish Congressmen who insist on
stopping Iran’s nuclear program by any means
necessary will soon find that the U.S. has fewer levers
to deal with the defiant Middle East state. The
American military are set to lose about 80 thousand
soldiers, a cost saving measure brought about by
record expenditures and deficits. In addition, a
broader set of cuts will affect each branch of the
armed services. “Operation Iranian Freedom” is now
far less realistic than many hardliners had previously
thought, especially when the real cost is counted.
The low probability of direct confrontation between
the U.S. and Iran is a serious setback for some of these
hawks in view of the statement made last month by
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IRAN’S  PROSPECTS  IN  THE  EVENT  OF  WAR
WITH  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  WEST
If attacked, Iran would probably be a much more formidable opponent
than any country the United States has locked horns with over the last few
decades. The U.S. should act with extreme caution if it is considering making
military attacks.
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Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in which he
suggested that Iran could possess nuclear weapons
before the end of 2012, even though, he insisted, this
is highly unlikely.
Yet while many state leaders do not hide their concern
at the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran any decision
which may lead to war between the U.S. and the
Islamic republic warrants intensive discussion before
the American people. Drowning out the voices of
those who oppose military intervention in Iran by
beating more ardently the drums of war is a surrogate
for genuine and open debate.
As American policymakers weigh up available
options, consideration should be given to five aspects
which nominally enhance Iran’s capabilities in a war
with the United States. They are especially important
as this year’s election is getting closer, and pleas for a
military solution are increasingly being heard both
inside and outside the United States.
The first point is that Iran could defend itself with
probably the most efficient army the United States
has encountered in decades. Iran’s military forces are
incomparably stronger than those of Haiti, Panama,
Grenada, Somalia, Serbia, Bosnia, Afghanistan or
Iraq. In all these cases, the U.S. military faced an
adversary unable to compete with overwhelming
American land, sea and air superiority. The Iranian
armed forces are far more competent and efficient,
and after watching and analyzing the 2003 war in Iraq
they have gained a good grasp of American tactics
and strategy. Some Iranian officers were even trained
in the U.S. during the reign of the last Shah,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919-80).
Adroit at littoral combat, the regular Iranian navy may
be able, many military experts believe, to block the
Strait of Hormuz for long enough to wreak economic
havoc. The recent Iranian naval exercises
demonstrate that Tehran has a ready-made strategy
that would seek to block the strait while
simultaneously trying to sink American – and
European – warships in the vicinity. The end result
would be significant losses to commercial shipping
and a spike in oil prices. However, the Iranian Navy,
with its Russian-made Kilo Class submarines armed
with torpedoes, agile frigates and fast corvettes, could
sustain an attack only for a short while, as the
American retaliation would be massive and
overwhelming. Iranian ships would be wiped out in a
matter of hours or a few days. U.S. Air Force fighter
aircraft would most likely strike at Bandar Abbas and
Kish Island ports (part of the Hormozgan Province of
Iran) to cut off the Iranian Navy from its rear
operating bases.
On the other hand, the proliferation of sales of
advanced air defense systems to countries like Iran
has given them highly sophisticated and integrated
anti-aircraft defense systems. These have the capacity
to inflict on American airpower a scale of losses not
seen since the Vietnam War. The decline in the U.S.
bomber force could result in unacceptable hardware
and human losses.
In contrast to Iraq, the first sight of U.S. ground troops
will not persuade Iran’s regular Army and the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard to lay down their arms. They are
the ones who, more than any other elements of the
regime, have studied the campaigns in Afghanistan
and Iraq and learned lessons in how to beat the
American Army, which can be achieved by not
fighting it directly but by adopting hit and run tactics,
or “asymmetrical warfare” in contemporary military
parlance.
Second, the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and
National Security (MOIS) is one of the world’s best
intelligence agencies. For over thirty years, MOIS
agents have shown impressive levels of efficiency.
They have hunted down and killed thousands of
dissidents and former officials of the Shah’s
government and valiantly countered real or perceived
threats to the republican regime. Despite the
precarious economic situation in the country, MOIS
still has the means to carry out assassinations,
espionage operations and other types of attacks
against selected targets. It is also likely that a
significant number of Iranian spies are operating
inside the United States, which has a large ethnic
Iranian immigrant population.
Although the pieces of the puzzle are still difficult to
put together, there are reasonable grounds for
assuming that Mansoor Arbabsiar, the Iranian who
plotted the assassination of Saudi ambassador Adel
al-Jubeir in the United States with the help of the
Mexican Zetas drug cartel in October 2011, was tied
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to MOIS. It is also known that MOIS has targeted
Iranian expatriates, imprisoning members of their
families and causing them great suffering and
personal injury. It is not impossible that some of the
1.5 million Iranian Americans living in the United
States become victims of such tactics.
Third, Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran, has a
greater ability to carry out terrorist attacks than al-
Qaida has ever had. This cluster organization has
been honing its combat skills for three decades by
fighting the Israelis in Lebanon and northern Israel. It
allegedly has links with merciless Latin American
drug cartels and can count on a global network of
agents. Theoretically, Hezbollah has the resources
and competence to execute large-scale attacks against
the United States and its interests abroad.
In fact, it is believed that Hezbollah cells are active in
Europe, Latin America and Asia as well as the United
States, making this terrorist group a real threat to
Iran’s opponents. The bombing of a U.S. Marine
barracks in Beirut in 1983, the Argentine-Israeli
Mutual Association in Buenos Aires in 1994 and the
Khobar Towers in SaudiArabia in 1996 speak volume
about Hezbollah’s history of global terrorism. If the
U.S. military decides to attack Iran, the risk of
Hezbollah undertaking a series of terrorist counter-
attacks will be seriously increased, and thwarting
these attacks will not be as easy as those of al-Qaeda.
Fourth, although already of superior quality, Iran’s
cyber-capabilities are being constantly upgraded. An
attack on Iranian nuclear facilities is likely to provoke
a prolonged cyber-attack of a type not yet seen.
Tehran will seek to inflict harm and disable public and
private data processing systems.
Fifth, U.S. forces have been conducting military
interventions almost nonstop over the last decade and
hence they deserve a break from war.Afghanistan and
Iraq have left their mark on the men and women
fighting for America and also taken their toll on the
equipment they use. Even a limited attack on Iran is
likely to spill over into a wider war. The U.S. Army
would then be exposed to a prolonged campaign in
exceptionally adverse battle conditions.
One must also realize that, on the war issue, the U.S.
and Iran have asymmetrical interests. For Iranian
leaders the very survival of their regime would be at
stake in any armed conflict, while for the United
States the stakes are significantly lower.
Even a strike focused purely on Iranian nuclear
facilities will trigger a reaction which will push the
conflict far beyond the "limited" objectives of the
Obama administration. While bringing U.S. troops
home from Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran’s main
neighbors, may induce Tehran to put the brakes on the
development of a “Shiite bomb,” a U.S. strategic
attack will conversely strengthen its determination to
build one and deepen the regime’s worst fears.
The Iranian regime has a greater aversion to risk than
many think. Although Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s
rhetoric and saber-rattling play well to the gallery and
make good political theater for insiders and the
international press, there is usually little behind them.
The suggestion that Ahmadinejad is just words, and
will not match them with deeds, is not far from the
truth. But ensuring the regime’s survival is
nevertheless a paramount objective, and this largely
explains why it uses a mix of bellicose provocations
and olive branch offerings. Pushing Iran to the brink
of the abyss may turn empty threats into a real war and
certainly jeopardize Obama’s efforts to cutAmerica’s
military budget.
Ultimately, Iran might prove less dangerous than
suggested above, and a war on Iranian soil and around
the Strait of Hormuz may be less costly in terms of
blood and budget than expected. But weighing all
“peaceful” options before taking up arms against Iran
is of the utmost importance if the best solution is to be
found.
For the United States it is crucial to determine what
preventing a nuclear-armed Iran is worth. If
Americans had understood the costs of the 2003 Iraq
war before launching it, one wonders today if they
would have gone along with it in the first place.
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